Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart Mill by Niesen, P.
Journal of Bentham Studies
Article
Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart Mill
Peter Niesen1,*
How to cite: Niesen, P. ‘Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart 
Mill.’ Journal of Bentham Studies, 2019, 18(1), pp. 1–19. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.14324/111.2045-757X.046.
Published: 14 January 2019
Peer Review:
This article has been peer reviewed through the journal’s standard double-blind peer-review, where both the 
reviewers and authors are anonymized during review.
Copyright:
© 2019, The Author(s). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License (CC-BY) 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited • 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14324/111.2045-757X.046.
Open Access:
Journal of Bentham Studies is a peer-reviewed open access journal.
*Correspondence: peter.niesen@uni-hamburg.de
1University of Hamburg, Germany
SPEECH,  TRUTH AND L IBERTY:  BENTHAM TO JOHN STUART MILL 1
Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham 
to John Stuart Mill1
Peter Niesen
Abstract
Bentham’s Utilitarianism transforms earlier free speech doctrine in the 
service of the pursuit of truth and the control of government, preserving 
the distinction between statements of opinion and of fact and awarding 
the latter a lesser degree of protection. The work of James Mill and the 
early writings of John Stuart Mill retain this distinction, but their accounts 
are weighed down by the problems of a direct Utilitarian approach, in 
their consequentialist balancing of different values against each other, 
and in their dependence on a majoritarian epistemology and their 
commitment to a naive progressive optimism. Mill goes on in On Liberty 
to address and resolve these problems on the basis of a new justification 
for free speech as free deliberative thought. I argue that, contrary to most 
interpretations, his new justification leaves untouched the basic distinc-
tion between absolutely protected expressions of opinion and only func-
tionally and contingently protected assertions of fact, leaving room for 
restrictions on factual statements, especially when untrue.
Keywords: Bentham; James Mill; John Stuart Mill; liberty; freedom of 
speech
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In his account of John Stuart Mill’s life as a public intellectual, Richard 
Reeves relates the history of a failed campaign that appears to have 
briefly landed the 16-year-old Mill in prison. With some companions, 
Mill had distributed controversial leaflets in a working-class neighbour-
hood, arguing for birth control and providing the necessary medical 
information: 
All animal procreation is the result of seminal contact between 
the sexes. With mankind and healthy married people, sexual 
intercourse is as unavoidable, as it is wholesome and virtuous. But 
it is by no means desirable, it is, indeed, a continued torture, that 
a married woman should be incessantly breeding or bringing forth 
children, often unhealthy, and born with a certainty of death in 
infancy and nothing but the patients of pain […]. What is done by 
other people is this. A piece of soft sponge is tied by a bobbin or 
penny ribbon, and inserted just before the sexual intercourse takes 
place, and is withdrawn again as soon as it has taken place. […] 
If the sponge be large enough, that is; as large as a green walnut, 
or a small apple, it will prevent conception, and thus, without 
diminishing the pleasures of married life, or doing the least injury 
to the health of the most delicate woman, both the woman and her 
husband will be saved from all the miseries which having too many 
children produces.2 
The leaflet assembles a number of Radical motives that would 
continue to shape Mill’s life and work: an unflinching look at social 
miseries, a naturalistic understanding of human relations, a disregard of 
religious and bourgeois notions of decorum, and an unfeigned concern 
for universal hedonism, together with an irrepressible penchant for 
education and improvement. Yet the most immediate point of connec-
tion to Mill’s own writing, and perhaps the reason for whatever slight 
fame the episode still commands, lies in the fact that it illustrates the 
limits of free public discussion in contemporary England. In prosecuting 
a publication that turns against the moral standards of its day and, at the 
same time, provides the necessary medical information for people to take 
their lives into their own hands, state and police reveal their despotic 
character. From Mill’s earliest publications, he joins the fight against the 
repression of public criticism of politics, religion and morals.3
Almost forty years later, in the second chapter of one of his most 
influential works, On Liberty, Mill returns to the topic. The chapter is 
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distinctive both in its freestanding argument and in its complicated rela-
tions to the earlier and later chapters of On Liberty, as well as to Mill’s other 
writings, among them his earlier works on free expression. Mill’s position 
is attractive, but the justification for his claims appears opaque and over-
determined. Not only is it an open question what the premises of the argu-
ment are, it is also unclear what its scope and conclusion are meant to 
be. Is Mill trying to vindicate ‘freedom of opinion’, ‘freedom of speech’ or 
‘freedom of expression’?4 How does his argument relate to older concep-
tions of the liberty of press, printing or publication? And how should we 
understand the fact that the title of Mill’s famous chapter claims to defend 
none of the above, but ‘the liberty of thought and discussion’?
In this paper, I want to argue that Mill’s mature account is best seen 
as a reaction to the limitations of the Utilitarian tradition of freedom of 
publication itself, especially to its positions on false opinions, true and 
false statements of fact, and the limits of free speech. I discuss Mill’s 
position against the backdrop of the doctrine that Jeremy Bentham, his 
father James Mill, and Mill himself in an earlier article had developed. 
John Stuart Mill’s mature account will no longer be drawn into political 
reductionism, naive epistemology, optimistic assumptions about public 
debate, or unprincipled balancing. Yet I argue that, despite his declara-
tion of independence from classical Utilitarian doctrine, he holds fast to a 
distinction between expressions of opinion and statements of fact. 
Classical Utilitarianism and Freedom of Speech
Mill introduces the second chapter of On Liberty by dissociating himself 
from an earlier understanding of free speech, which he believes to have 
lost almost all relevance. This is the liberty of the press as a security 
against arbitrary interferences, by autocratic governments, into the lives 
and beliefs of their citizens. Mill identifies press freedom with the liberty 
of ‘political discussion’, which he goes on to distinguish from a liberty of 
truly ‘public discussion’ that is yet to be established.5 The fact that Mill 
believes press freedom has been completely vindicated intellectually (if 
not always institutionally) is mirrored in the title of his chapter. Where 
Jeremy Bentham, founder of the Utilitarian tradition of free speech, had 
argued for ‘liberty of the press, and public discussion,6 Mill demands 
‘liberty of thought and discussion’. 
From John Milton‘s Areopagitica to Immanuel Kant‘s ‘An Answer 
to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, controversies over freedom 
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of speech had always focused on printed works, and on religious and 
political dissent.7 Bentham and James Mill continue this tradition by 
assigning press freedom a functional task within an antagonistic polit-
ical system. Newspapers are bulwarks and weapons in the permanent 
struggle between the ‘ruling few’ and the ‘subject many’, with the ruling 
few withholding from the subject many what they do not want them to 
know, and prescribing what they want them to believe.8 Already in his 
first publication, A Fragment on Government, Bentham had introduced 
press freedom as a relation between citizen subjects and governmental 
power-holders. The motto of a good citizen was ‘To obey punctually; to 
censure freely’.9 In his mature 1822 account, Bentham is led to conclude 
that we can tell a system of free government from a despotic one by the 
fact that a citizen who publicly criticises it has no more to fear than a 
citizen who publicly praises it.10 
The central function of the press, in Bentham’s account, is to iden-
tify and censure abuse of government power. The value of free speech 
is accordingly instrumental, not intrinsic. Douglas Long, in what is still 
the standard account of the basic liberties in Bentham’s political thought, 
has thus proposed a Utilitarian reductionist account of Bentham on free 
speech: 
Bentham’s espousal of liberty of the press and public discussion 
was no more profoundly liberal or libertarian than his endorsement 
of any other species of liberty. It was founded upon a purely 
utilitarian calculus of the good and evil consequences involved in 
the establishment and maintenance of those liberties.11
While it is of course true that Bentham’s account of free speech is 
embedded in his Utilitarian outlook, this should not lead us to conclude 
that he was oblivious of the necessity of giving a principled defence of 
press freedom, or incapable of providing such a defence, or that he was 
too quick to sacrifice free speech for other interests in cases of collision. 
Bentham’s account of a free press is based on his political psychology 
and on the value of true belief in politics rather than on direct calcula-
tions of aggregate happiness. This becomes manifest in his strategy for 
reform, first directed against William Blackstone’s account of common 
law, and further developed in his later writings on domestic and foreign 
constitutional law. Blackstone sides with John Milton in considering 
‘previous restraint’, i.e. the licensing and ex ante censorship of publica-
tion, incompatible with free government, and in combining this with a 
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plea for the post hoc prosecution of ‘blasphemous, immoral, treason-
able, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels’, which he thinks fully 
compatible with stringent guarantees for the liberty of the press: ‘Neither 
is a restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of 
private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad 
sentiments, is the crime which society corrects.’12 
Bentham’s first point of critique is that governments will exploit 
the intimidating effect that not only previous restraint, but also the 
prosecution of offences, will have.13 His second argument concerns 
the potential truth value of allegations. While Blackstone holds that the 
public dissemination of ‘bad sentiments’ must be curtailed, Bentham 
rejects the ‘bad sentiments’ criterion since it forces us to assess a public 
statement irrespective of its truth or falsity. Also, using the ‘bad senti-
ments’ standard, common law punished public allegations against 
well-known government functionaries more severely than allegations 
against citizens, since government elites had more to lose and faced 
more extensive disadvantages if their reputation was damaged.14 From 
a direct Utilitarian point of view, it is an open question whether the 
harms caused by aggressive speech are always borne out by the utility 
of disclosure, but Bentham’s reform programme ignores this possi-
bility. He advocates impunity from prosecution for statements that 
are demonstrably true, and for most libellous speech targeting state 
functionaries.15 
Bentham does not believe that all statements should be protected. 
For example, he argues that ‘exciting men to the commission of [an] 
offence’ should be prohibited.16 With regard to offences against repu-
tation, he distinguishes between specific imputations (defamation) and 
‘vague and general’ criticism (vituperation). Vituperation, ‘how gross 
soever’, should always be tolerated, while more specific allegations 
‘imputing an individual act legally punishable, or at least disreputable’ 
should not always be protected. We have seen that Bentham defends 
all true allegations, regardless of their consequences. But even for false 
and defamatory statements of fact he demands immunity, provided they 
have not been ‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accom-
panied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rash-
ness’.17 Bentham’s leniency towards factual errors asserted in good 
faith is not owed to any substantive contribution which false statements 
of fact could make to the information of the public, but to the dangers 
of an overly zealous prosecution and to the function of the press to act 
as a  counter-power. The grounds for toleration of false and damaging 
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statements lie in their ‘check upon the conduct of the ruling few, … indis-
pensably necessary to the maintenance of good government’.18
The definitive early Utilitarian statement on press freedom we owe 
to James Mill, Bentham’s former secretary and the father of John Stuart. 
In his article on ‘Liberty of the Press’ in the supplementary volumes 
to Encyclopaedia Britannica, James Mill situates the relevance of free 
speech, just as Bentham did, entirely within the antagonistic relationship 
between rulers and the ruled. He puts his main emphasis on the service 
of free speech in the process of telling false from true opinions. James 
Mill argues
that there is no safety for the people in allowing any body to 
choose opinions for them; that there are no marks by which it 
can be decided beforehand, what opinions are true and what are 
false; that there must, therefore, be equal freedom of declaring all 
opinions, both true and false; and that, when all opinions, true and 
false, are equally declared, the assent of the greater number, when 
their interests are not opposed to them, may always be expected to 
be given to the true.19 
The necessity of protecting false opinions, along with true ones, 
from prosecution and control, is here ascribed to our epistemic short-
comings. We have no way of grasping the truth and falsity of opinions in 
advance of their public dissemination. For James Mill, the decisive epis-
temic mechanism lies in the ‘declaring’ of opinions, as the prevailing of 
a majority opinion, ‘the assent of the greater number’, can under condi-
tions of disinterestedness be trusted as a criterion of their truth. 
James Mill introduced his Encyclopaedia entry with the provocative 
statement that unlimited press freedom could never be a proper goal 
of reform, since the press was capable of committing a large number of 
offences. Utilitarianism was in no way committed to free speech abso-
lutism.20 John Stuart Mill copies this introduction verbatim in his own 
early, sycophantic essay of 1825, ‘Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press’, 
and comments, ‘That the press may be so employed as to require punish-
ment, we are very far from denying: it may be made the instrument of 
almost every imaginable crime.’21 In contrast to Bentham, both Mills are 
eager to convey that the press does not deserve any general immunity. 
Offences committed by and through the press should be treated in the 
same way the law treats other offences. In the 1820s, neither Mill sees a 
need to distinguish between disutility resulting from speech and disutility 
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caused through other modes of action. Harm is harm; and offences or 
‘violations’ may be of a linguistic or a non-linguistic character.22 The Mills 
fight the use of the law of libel in politically motivated attempts to intimi-
date non-conformist critics of government, church or public morality, but 
they do not award expressive liberties any priority. 
The younger Mill follows his father and Bentham in identifying the 
‘sinister’ interest of those in power in suppressing ‘great and important 
truths’ and in upholding ‘slavish opinions in politics [and] in religion’.23 
Press freedom is to guarantee the truth and utility of political beliefs: ‘In 
the correctness of the estimate which the people form of the goodness of 
their government, their whole happiness is involved.’24 In the long term, 
nothing but ‘the balance of argument’ will determine ‘the decision of the 
majority’.25 The young Mill sides with Milton’s Areopagitica and James 
Mill’s Encyclopaedia article in believing that ‘truth, if it has fair play, 
always in the end triumphs over error, and becomes the opinion of the 
world’.26 
As Filimon Peonidis has observed, Mill’s early essay recognises that 
truth and falsity play out in different ways for expressions of opinion and 
for statements of fact. Mill advocates free speech for false opinions, but 
diverges from Bentham in accepting blanket restrictions on false state-
ments of fact:27 
It must be admitted that the case of facts, and the case of opinions, 
are not precisely similar. False opinions must be tolerated for the 
sake of the true: since it is impossible to draw any line by which 
true and false opinions can be separated from one another. There 
is no corresponding reason for permitting the publication of false 
statements of fact.28 
Mill’s distinction between opinions and facts has a forensic 
basis. Truth, in the case of facts, does not depend on opinion, but on 
‘evidence’, and may therefore ‘be safely left to be decided by those, on 
whom the business of deciding upon evidence in other cases devolves’, 
i.e., the courts.29 The distinction between facts and opinions immedi-
ately generates an argument for the freedom to express true statements 
of facts, since true opinions must be based on facts. Even for truthful 
statements, Mill grants that there will remain controversial cases in 
which an interest of the public seems to speak in favour of their publica-
tion, while the protection of the private sphere of an individual speaks 
against it. ‘The truths which it most imports to the public to know, 
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are precisely those which give most annoyance to individuals, whose 
vices and follies they expose.’ In such cases, ‘there is no one who can 
be trusted to decide which are useful, which the unimportant truths’. 
But how to identify the cases in which ‘it would be desirable … that 
truth should be suppressed’?30 Unlike his father, who suggested a direct 
Utilitarian calculation of the advantages and disadvantages of indis-
creet, but true, publications,31 the younger Mill does not formulate a 
general answer. 
In sum, the early Utilitarian conception of free speech is a clear and 
coherent political doctrine. The liberty of the press is grounded in the 
antagonistic constellation between rulers and ruled – a constellation that 
Mill will later see transformed, if not left behind, by the introduction of 
constitutional and representative government.32 Free speech is a means 
for arriving at the truth, yet with different implications for expressions 
of opinions and of statements of fact. The expression of false opinions 
must be tolerated in the absence of a mechanism that could weed them 
out in advance, and true opinions will sooner or later be revealed by 
majoritarian approval. Factual truth is the basis of true opinion, and thus 
generally, but not universally, to be included in the protection of free 
communication. Sometimes, direct Utilitarian balancing is encouraged, 
as in the case of undesirable but true factual statements.33 For James and 
the young John Stuart Mill, it is intuitively clear that ‘violations’ must be 
curtailed, and that false statements of fact enjoy no protection whatso-
ever. Bentham advocates a more extensive protection of libellous opinion 
and some false statements of fact, but bases his claims exclusively on 
the dangers of repression. Both Bentham’s and James Mill’s generalised 
distrust in government will become less plausible once popular consti-
tutionalism is in place. When Mill, in On Liberty, defends the ‘liberty of 
thought and discussion’, he is aware that he must give a more substantive 
argument, one that is persuasive even under conditions of a responsive 
representative government.
Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion
Mill’s new approach, in the second chapter of On Liberty, reflects the 
realities of popular representative government. In focusing on the 
threat of social conformity that comes with it, he implicitly rejects both 
Miltonian optimism and James Millian majoritarian epistemology. Mill 
distinguishes between true and false opinions, and within the latter set 
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between completely and partially false opinions. The suppression of 
opinions he rejects for all three cases, for the following reasons: 
1. a suppressed opinion could be true; 
2. a suppressed opinion could be false, but contain a true element; 
3. a suppressed false opinion could lead to a state of affairs in 
which the opposite true opinion is held as dogma and loses its 
meaning and significance.34
The first case appears straightforward enough. If there is a chance 
that restrictions on free expression deprive the citizenry of a correct 
opinion, this is to be avoided quite independently of Mill’s further claim 
that banning opinions always entails a claim to infallibility. If any further 
basis for admitting all potentially true opinion is deemed necessary, Mill 
can draw attention to the fact that the truth of an opinion is intimately 
connected with its utility.35 Utility, Mill insists, remains the only standard 
for delineating the extension of all liberties, ‘but it must be utility in the 
largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progres-
sive being’.36 What is less plausible is that he should commit himself to 
the view that ‘no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful’.37 
Before we can clear up the status of false beliefs, we need to turn to 
the very capacity of opinions to be true or false. Seen from the perspec-
tive of today’s jurisprudence, Mill’s cognitivism with regard to opinion 
is an outright provocation. In an oft-quoted definition by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, ‘expressions of opinion’ are today under-
stood as speech acts that display ‘elements of commenting, opining, reck-
oning [Stellungnahme, Dafürhalten, Meinen]’.38 This conception gives 
freedom of speech a subjectivist taint, as if all expression of opinion and 
public discussion were only concerned with personal holding-true, not 
with the correction of error and the pursuit of knowledge. In On Liberty, 
Mill would have found it easy to tap into the resources of the other chap-
ters for a non-cognitivist defence of free expression, drawing on other 
practices of self-expression in which a person’s individuality can mani-
fest itself. But while, for example, in the third chapter, freedom of self- 
expression serves processes of authentic character-formation, the second 
chapter discusses free speech exclusively in the context of the truth 
or falsity of propositional attitudes. Free speech does not stand in the 
service of expressing oneself, but of expressing that something is the case. 
It is a misreading to see Mill as defending ‘mere’ expression in abstraction 
from the pursuit of truth.39
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While Mill presupposes the cognitive character of opinions in order 
to justify the truth-oriented character of public debate, he does not iden-
tify expressions of opinion and statements of facts. He allows that in the 
struggle between opinions, facts can decide the issue.40 Opinions build 
on facts, and will accommodate the presentation of facts in discussion, 
but true opinions themselves are not facts, and expressions of opinion are 
not statements of fact. Mill sees opinion and facts as complementing each 
other: just as opinion has to rely on a factual basis, facts are dependent on 
opinion. Independently of their embedding in discourse, interpretation 
and comment, facts can have hardly any influence on thought: 
There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be 
interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact 
and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on 
the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell 
their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning.41 
Without interpretation and comment, coming to a genuine 
understanding of the facts will be impossible. Hence Mill groups fact- 
interpreting statements with opinions and awards them full protection 
under freedom of speech. The same is true for ‘explanations’ of facts, 
which will be perennially controversial: ‘[T]here is always some other 
explanation possible of the same facts’, and as long as we do not grasp 
them ‘we do not understand the grounds of our opinion’.42 But while 
interpretations of facts, and explanations of fact, should thus be protected 
along with expression of opinions under the liberty of thought and public 
discussion, this does not entail that pure statements of fact will profit 
from the same stringent protection. 
Before we address the question of whether liberty of thought and 
discussion extends to all statements of fact, we need to face a second 
provocation. This provocation lies in Mill’s claim that expressions of true 
and false opinions should be granted the same degree of protection. 
Departing from his father’s doctrine, Mill no longer holds our epistemic 
deficit in telling truth from falsity in the absence of a public roll-call to be 
decisive. He grounds the liberty to express false opinions on two substan-
tive arguments. The first is that false opinions can contain a correct 
aspect. The second, more important for our purposes, is that an engage-
ment even with fully and irredeemably false opinions ensures that the 
full meaning of the corresponding true opinion will be contemplated in a 
clear and vivid way. Earlier, both James and John Stuart Mill had argued 
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for freedom of publication as a means of producing a reliable cognitive 
output: If only we feed the mechanism of press freedom with true and 
false statements, preponderantly true opinion will be produced. This 
view is vulnerable to the objection that if an alternative way for gener-
ating true beliefs were available, free speech would no longer be needed. 
Mill’s alternative defence, in On Liberty, of expressions of false opinion 
shows that he is no longer exclusively relying on a truth-functional argu-
ment for freedom of expression. Serious and renewed confrontations 
with alternative views have a significance which is independent of the 
mere replacement of false with true opinion.43 
The contemplation of false alternatives, and the defence of one’s 
beliefs against them, is a key element in grasping the truth of our opin-
ions. Only in confronting and rejecting contrary beliefs, as John Milton 
argued in Areopagitica, do we win the entitlement to call convictions 
‘our own’. Mill adds that we have no claim to judge our own opinions 
to be better than those of others if we have not put them to the test and 
faced objections.44 The figure of Socrates in On Liberty is there to remind 
us that discussion is not teleologically geared to amassing true opinion, 
but rather to the understanding of problems.45 Liberty of discussion is 
thus based on the value of mental engagement. If by ‘deliberation’ we 
mean the argumentative pursuit of well-understood convictions, we 
can say that the rationale of free speech in Mill is to make possible, 
next to gaining true beliefs, a free process of individual and collective 
deliberation.46 
Bentham and James Mill, in defending press freedom, had focused 
exclusively on the wide dissemination of true opinions, not on any active 
individual engagement with them. In recognising the independent value 
of one’s own deliberative endeavours, the title of On Liberty’s second 
chapter, ‘Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’, indicates where Mill 
goes beyond the older debate. ‘Liberty of Thought’ has a dual meaning 
here. For all practical purposes, a society that allows all opinions to 
be disseminated and publicly discussed allows, at the same time, free 
thought. In a first, weak sense, then, freedom of expression realises 
freedom of thought. Understood in a stronger sense, ‘liberty of thought’ 
figures as the reason why speech should be free. As we have seen, the 
unconditional protection of speech is grounded in our capacity for inde-
pendent and self-determined deliberation in the search for truth. Liberty 
of thought, in the second and stronger sense, is an intrinsically valuable 
practical competence; it is part of what utility, for progressive beings, 
consists in.
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With the substantive reasons for protecting true and false opinions 
in place, we can now revert to the issue of facts. Above, I suggested that 
Mill’s argument, even though it is based on a cognitivist understanding 
of opinions, does not automatically extend to facts. It is compatible with 
neither true nor false statements of fact being protected under free speech. 
On Liberty, however, does not contradict the position he adopts in ‘Law of 
Libel’, that true opinions will have their basis in true factual convictions. 
If we are aiming at correctness and independence of thought, it is incon-
ceivable that we should want to withhold facts from thinkers. We there-
fore have strong, perhaps compelling, reasons to protect the expression 
of true statements of fact for the sake of the formation of correct opinion. 
But already the young John Stuart Mill had drawn attention to one intui-
tive counterexample. Concerning the publication of information on indi-
viduals’ private lives, it seems that less stringent protection of speech is 
called for. Can, according to the argument employed in On Liberty, the 
dissemination of true statements be prohibited? Jonathan Riley has 
discussed a case in which somebody passes nude photographs of a former 
lover to the press as a conflict between entitlements – on the one hand 
an ‘act of expressing and publishing, without her consent, his sincere and 
undistorted opinions of their sex life’, on the other, an act that damages 
her conflicting claims to self-determination, which should in this case be 
seen as trumping his entitlement to free speech.47 For Riley, this is a hard 
case because there is a prima facie claim to freedom for all expressions 
of opinion. According to the present reading, the publication of private 
photos is more plausibly understood as making true statements of facts, 
not as expressing opinions. True statements of fact, as mere functional 
prerequisites of freedom of thought, not its instantiations, need not be 
seen as deserving unconditional protection under Mill’s new justification 
for free speech. I conclude that there is a case for the protection of most, 
though not all, true statements of fact under Mill’s mature theory.
What are the implications of this view for irredeemably false state-
ments of facts? This question is today usually debated with regard to 
defamation; German and French law contribute the further example of 
the denial of historical facts, most prominently the denial of the geno-
cide of the European Jews under National Socialism. While restrictions 
on defamation are usually accepted as exceptional within a comprehen-
sive conception of freedom of speech,48 bans on the denial of histor-
ical facts are highly controversial. Germany’s penal code, for example, 
prohibits ‘the denial, endorsement or trivialisation (Leugnung, Billigung, 
Verharmlosung)’ of large-scale National Socialist crimes (§130). While 
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the Federal Constitutional Court believes the statute to be compat-
ible with the free expression of opinion (as protected under Article 5 
of the Basic Law),49 Mill’s On Liberty is usually understood as ruling out 
the legitimacy of such a statute.50 The reading proposed here entails that 
the latter view is partially correct, partially false. Mill parts company 
with the Court in including interpretations of facts, such as endorsement 
and trivialisation, with the free expression of opinions. But he may well 
side with the Court as far as denial of the Holocaust, a false statement 
of fact, is concerned. This seems true even for the earlier Utilitarian 
position. We have seen that even the most extensive guarantee afforded 
to false statements of fact, in Bentham’s writings, does not extend to 
statements that display ‘rashness’ and ‘wilful mendacity’. The German 
Court takes a similar position in arguing that denials of the Holocaust 
are demonstrably and/or consciously false statements of fact and derive 
none of the protection accorded to the free expression of opinion.51 
In On Liberty, Mill never revises the restrictive position on false 
statements of facts advanced in ‘Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press’.52 
But should the new reasons adduced in On Liberty have swayed his posi-
tion? Not, surely, with regard to the pursuit of truth. We cannot take 
seriously the possibility that the correct formation of opinion should 
be dependent on false statements of fact in the same way that it must 
rely on true ones. Gaining true beliefs regarding others, or regarding the 
past, is not supported by protecting false information. With regard to our 
initial example, the dissemination of true but not of false statements on 
contraception stands in the service of developing true beliefs. It would 
be absurd if somebody who knowingly made false statements about the 
quality of an unsafe bridge appealed to freedom of expression.53 But 
could it be objected that Mill’s argument for admitting irredeemably 
false opinions, their contribution to gaining and upholding a vivid and 
complete understanding of the opposite view, applies likewise to false 
statements of facts? Should the world of facts be subjected to an inde-
pendent and self-determined quest, just as he recommends for the realm 
of opinion, that is, for religion, morals and politics?
In On Liberty, Mill presents one case to which his reasons for delib-
erative freedom do not straightforwardly apply. In mathematics, it is 
unclear what a protection of false statements could achieve. ‘The pecu-
liarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is that all the argument is 
on one side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections.’54 
In his critique of Auguste Comte, six years after the publication of On 
Liberty, Mill takes a different approach. He objects to Comte’s provocative 
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denial of an ‘“absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of unlim-
ited freedom of conscience”’. Comte thought such an entitlement existed 
neither in “‘astronomy, physics, chemistry, [nor] physiology’.55 Mill 
duly registers that even stating that ‘two and two make ten’ should be 
protected as a matter of law,56 but it is not clear that the argument of 
On Liberty would bolster his claim. Although freedom of conscience 
guarantees ‘absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, 
practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological’,57 mathematics 
is no matter for opinion and sentiment. Even in his essay on ‘Comte and 
Positivism’, Mill never asserts what Comte denies, that the claim to a 
universal entitlement to free speech extends to matters of scientific and 
academic expertise. Arguably, the self-determined working-through 
of false factual beliefs in the areas of arithmetic, astronomy and histo-
riography does not contribute to leading a self-determined life within 
the evolution of a ‘progressive’ species in the same sense as does delib-
eration over opinions and interpretations – at least as long as we can 
securely assume that inner-academic and inner-scientific controversies 
will continue, and that their public dissemination will be safeguarded. 
Contemporary, functionally differentiated societies seem to employ a 
division of labour and delegate the questioning of a world of facts, and its 
permanent critique, to science and the universities, protecting them not 
under freedom of speech, but under academic freedom, another branch 
of the same stem of the liberty of thought.58
I conclude that the type of communicative freedom that Mill defends 
in ‘Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’ is neither an unqualified 
freedom of expression encompassing all utterances regardless of their 
capacity to be true or false, nor an unqualified freedom of speech that 
encompasses all utterances regardless of their character as statements of 
fact or expressions of opinion, but the freedom to express one’s opinion, 
regardless of its truth or falsity. Only once the protective perimeter of 
free speech has been drawn can we ask what limits on the expression of 
opinion Mill is prepared to tolerate, and, in closing, I would like to offer 
a brief sketch. 
Mill’s early account of the limits of free speech in ‘Law of Libel’ 
followed James Mill’s in insisting that speakers could be made legally 
responsible for ‘offences’ and ‘violations’. In On Liberty, Mill at first glance 
reaffirms this view when he argues that utterances of ‘Corn-dealers are 
starvers of the poor’ or ‘Tyrannicide is lawful’ could, under specific circum-
stances, be lawfully prosecuted.59 On the surface, a notion of harm does 
the work in resolving the conflict between claims to free expression of 
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opinion, on the one hand, and claims to security and inviolability, on the 
other: ‘Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm 
to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require 
to be, controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by 
the active interference of mankind.’60 If the expression of opinions causes 
harm, James Mill and the young John Stuart had argued, it cannot claim 
stringent protection. Some leading interpreters have read On Liberty as 
limiting free speech along the lines of the causation of harm,61 and have 
specified important balancing interests. 
Assuming that Mill’s fresh start in On Liberty was partly motivated by 
the unsatisfactory balancing of conflicting claims in early Utilitarianism, 
we can support a simpler, and at the same time more radical, reading that 
does not directly appeal to the notion of harm.62 When Mill claims that 
‘even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which 
they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive 
instigation to some mischievous act’,63 he is referring not to the intended 
or probable harms caused by the incriminated speech act, but to the defi-
cits of the situation when viewed as a forum for deliberation. If freedom 
of expression stands in the service of making up one’s own mind in an 
independent manner, the objective features of situations that disallow 
contributing to this goal will at the same time speak against the protec-
tion of expression. The first step towards the identification of incitement 
does not therefore lie in identifying the perpetrators’ harmful intention 
and the objective probability of harm, or in distinguishing between 
‘actions’ and ‘opinions’,64 but in diagnosing a communicative constella-
tion as unfit to support the liberty of thought in the strong sense. From 
this, it does not follow that only calm, deliberative styles of conversa-
tion will deserve protection.65 Under Mill’s mature conception, non- 
deliberative challenges may be apt to revive dogmatic beliefs if they are 
uttered in situations amenable to deliberation. Independence of thought, 
in discourses turned scholastic or clichéd, may be best served by disrup-
tions or even by a curse.66 
The nuanced character of Mill’s mature account, then, can be 
briefly summed up with reference to the problem of hate speech. As we 
have seen, his account allows the prosecution of hate speech in the form 
of defamation, that is, where the expression in question contains false 
allegations of fact. False statements of fact enjoy no protection in the first 
place, and can therefore be restricted in the absence of any balancing of 
conflicting claims. Also, regulating non-factual hate speech in situations 
that obstruct the potential for deliberation is unproblematic. In contrast, 
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identifying non-factual hate speech by the content of the message 
involved and restricting it on the basis of probable harm alone67 should 
be considered illegitimate. It reads into On Liberty a position that James 
and the young John Stuart held, and from which Mill’s later account 
sought to emancipate. 
If we take seriously the deliberative telos of free speech in On 
Liberty, we can bypass the notion of harm in identifying situations in 
which expression can be regulated. In embracing the value of delibera-
tion, Mill transcends the early Utilitarians’ politically antagonistic vision 
and adds to his own early truth-functional understanding of free speech. 
Cognitive progress, in On Liberty, results from individual engagement 
and public discussion, not from majoritarian verdicts. The continuing 
struggle between true, partially true and irredeemably false opinions 
is a necessary feature of the independence and self-determination of 
individual and collective thought. In seeking to avoid objections to his 
mature account that arise from its near-absolute protection of expression 
of opinion, Mill does well to continue to discriminate between statements 
of opinion and statements of fact. 
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